Abstract-In Pedersen's VSS scheme the secret is embedded in commitments. And the polynomial used is of degree at most (t-1). In strong -(t, n) VSS which based on Pedersen's scheme that polynomial in verification purpose is public polynomial. The public polynomial in their scheme which acts in verification purpose is not secure. And the secret is secure if the dealer cannot solve the discrete logarithm problem. In our propose scheme we will satisfy the security requirements in strong t-consistency and consider the security on verification polynomial used. We will show in shares verification algorithm the participants can verify that their shares are consistent and the dealer is honest (i.e. the dealer cannot success in distributing incorrect shares even the dealer can solve the discrete logarithm problem.) before start secret reconstruction algorithm. The security strength of the proposed scheme lies in the fact that the shares and all the broadcasted information convey no information about the secret.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1979, Shamir introduced the threshold secret sharing scheme as a solution for safeguarding cryptographic keys. In [1] , his scheme triggered the consideration of how a secret key could be shared with multiple participants. Shamir ' s SSS has been used as the foundation for wide research in the computer security field. Thus, an overview of his important scheme is provided, followed by a simple example of his scheme.
Basic secret sharing schemes assume that the dealer who divides the secret and distributes the shares of the secret to participants is a mutually trusted party. In 1985, Chor et al. [2] extended the original secret sharing approach and presented the concept of verifiable secret sharing. The property of verifiability enables participants to verify that their shares are consistent (a set of n shares is t -consistent if any subset containing t shares defines the same secret S).
There are two types of verifiable secret sharing schemes: interactive VSS and non-interactive VSS. In interactive VSSS, participants can only prove and verify their shares are t -consistent by making contact with the other participants online (who are selected in the secret reconstruction phase). In non-interactive VSSS, the participants can verify their shares are t -consistent without talking to each other or with the dealer. Both types allow the validity of the secret share to be verified without the share being revealed. Both types of VSSS are based on the property that says: if the sum of two polynomials is of degree at most 1  t , then either both are of degree at most 1  t or both are of degree greater than 1  t .
In [3] , Benaloh proposed an interactive VSSS. In Benaloh's scheme, the dealer chooses a secret polynomial ) ( 
According to the security property, the verifiable secret sharing schemes can be classified into two types: the computationally secure schemes [3, 4] and the unconditionally secure schemes [5, 6] . For example, Feldman's VSSS [4] is a computationally secure scheme based on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem, Nikova's VSSS [5] and Pederson's VSSS [6] are unconditionally secure schemes. Furthermore, there are VSSS based on some computational assumptions.
This paper first provides an overview of Shamir's scheme, followed by an overview of Pedersen's approach to remove the assumption in Feldman's VSSS and propose a VSSS which is information-theoretically secure. The information-theoretically secure strong ) , ( n t -VSS of [7] is then presented. Our proposed scheme the polynomial differential-based information-theoretically secure scheme that satisfies both definitions of tconsistency and strong t -consistency is then proposed.
II. PREVIOUS STUDY
In this section we have to mention, in general, the important threshold schemes in secret sharing is Shamir's scheme [1] , the second part will be about Pedersen's (n, t, n) -SSS, and finally in this section will be overview about strong (t, n) -VSS [8] .
A. Shamir's SSS
In 1979, Shamir introduced the threshold secret sharing scheme as a solution for safeguarding cryptographic keys. In [1] , his scheme triggered the consideration of how a secret key could be shared with multiple participants. Shamir's SSS has been used as the foundation for wide research in the computer security field. Thus, an overview of his important scheme is provided, followed by a simple example of his scheme. 
The above scheme satisfies the basic security requirements of the SSS as follows:
• With knowledge of any t or more than t shares, it can reconstruct the secret S.
• With knowledge of any fewer than t shares, the secret S cannot be reconstructed.
B. Pedersen's Information-Theoretically Secure VSSS
In 1992, Pedersen [6] proposed a non-interactive and information-theoretically secure VSSS based on Feldman's VSSS. In Shamir's ) , ( n t -SSS [1] , a dealer is a trusted third party who generates and distributes shares to participants by using polynomial
Definition 2 t -consistency of shares [6]: A set of n shares is t -consistent if any subset containing t shares defines the same secret.
Shamir's scheme is information-theoretically secure since the scheme satisfies the security requirement without making any computational assumptions. In Shamir's scheme, t participants (and more) can reconstruct the secret S, and fewer than t participants know nothing about the secret S and cannot reconstruct it. In [3] , Benaloh observed that a share in Shamir's ) , ( n t -
SSS is t -consistent if and only if the interpolation of
shares yields a polynomial of degree at most 1  t . In Feldman's VSS scheme [4] , the committed values are publicly known and the privacy of secret S depends on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem. In other words, Feldman's scheme is computationally secure (i.e., the scheme is based on some computational assumptions). Pedersen [6] 
As in Shamir's scheme, the secret reconstruction algorithm operates such that any t participants and more than t participants can reconstruct the secret and fewer than t participants cannot reconstruct it. In Pedersen's scheme, the value b , then the security in his scheme will be computational security. The scheme proposed in this paper (Section 3) fixes this problem by using a secret verification polynomial which acts as a random polynomial in Pedersen's VSSS and in a strong 3. The secret reconstruction algorithm is the same as in Shamir's scheme: any t participants and more than t participants can reconstruct the secret and fewer than t participants cannot reconstruct it.
It is observed that the difference between the strong ) , ( n t -VSSS and Pedersen's scheme is that shares in the strong ) , ( n t -VSS are combined in two polynomials. The first one is a secret polynomial, and the second one is a public polynomial. The public polynomial acts to ensure that the secret polynomial is of degree 1  t exactly so that the strong ) , ( n t -VSS satisfies the security requirement of t -consistency.
It is noted that the public polynomial is not secure in [7] . Thus, the scheme proposed by Changlu, Harn and Dingfeng still has the same security issue as in Pedersen's scheme. In both schemes, the broadcasted information j c still contains information about the secret. The strength in both schemes depends on the difficulty of solving the discreet logarithm problem. In Pedersen's VSSS, the secret is embedded in commitments, and the polynomial used is at most of degree This derivative polynomial serves the purpose of verification. The verification polynomial is also a secret as it is the polynomial used which shares the secret S. Finally, the dealer applies Shamir's SSS to generate and distribute the verification shares. The scheme proposed in this section shows that the verification polynomial has two roles. The first one is to ensure that the shares satisfy a strong t -consistency, and the second role is to verify that the shares are tconsistent. The discussion in this section shows that the proposed scheme is more secure than Pedersen's VSSS [6] and strong ) , ( n t -VSSS [7] . Let p , q , g , h be the same parameters as in Pedersen's VSSS; the dealer D will divide the secret p Z S  for n participants. The proposed scheme is described as follows:
1. In the share generation algorithm, D: (a) Creates polynomial , and then use the Lagrange interpolation again to find the secret S.
Next, Theorem (3.1) demonstrates that the proposed scheme satisfies the basic requirements of a secret sharing scheme as in Shamir's scheme:
• With knowledge of any t or more than t shares, the secret S can be reconstructed.
• With knowledge of less than t shares, the secret S cannot be reconstructed.
This means that the proposed scheme has strong tconsistency. b , then Pedersen's scheme will be computationally secure). In a strong ) , ( n t -VSSS [7] , the public polynomial is not secure. The scheme still has the same security as in Pedersen's scheme. In both schemes, the broadcasted information 0 c still contains information about the secret.
The strength in both schemes depends on the difficulty of solving the discreet logarithm problem. The proposed scheme used the polynomial ) (x F The proposed scheme guarantees that it is information-theoretically secure. It is more secure than both the Pederson and strong ) , ( n t schemes.
V. CONCLUSION
The contribution in this paper is the development of a polynomial differential-based information-theoretically secure scheme that satisfies both definitions of tconsistency and strong t -consistency. As discussed, when the participants successfully complete the share verification algorithm, the participants still know no information about the secret S. The proposed scheme succeeds in eliminating the problem of an attacker resolving the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem (the broadcasted information j c tells nothing about the secret, unlike Pederson's scheme and the strong ) , ( n t scheme when the commitment value is not secure).
In addition, this paper considered whether the proposed scheme satisfies the basic requirements of a secret sharing scheme. It was concluded that the proposed scheme is more secure than Pederson's scheme and the strong ) , ( n t scheme, and it is information-theoretically secure.
